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[8. F. No. 17249. lD Bank. Nov. 27. 1945.J

JOHN B. ELLIS et aI., Petitioners, v. THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT et al .. Respondents.
[1] 8ehools-Property-Ule as Oenter for Oommunity Activities.
-The Civie Center Act (Ed. Code, §§ 19431-19439), relating to
the use of school buildinJ;rS or gTounds as eenters for community activities. is controlling - with regard to the use of
sehool property for luch purposes, and regulations or terms
and conditions made bv the IIchool board in conflict therewith
.
are invalid.
[i] Id.-Property-Uae as Oenter for Oommunity Activiti_PubHe Liability Iuurance.-The srrantinlt by a echool board to an

[1] Uee of echool property for other than sehool or religious
purposes, not. 86 A.L.B.. ltD!,). See. 1I1so. 23 OaLJ'ar. 102; '7
Am.lar. 344.
McX.xq. Beference: [1-5] Schools, 165.
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outside organization of pcr~issioil to use a school auditorillm
for a free public meeting cannot be coni!itioned on paympnt
by such organization of~p cost of pnhlil' liAhility inSllrAnce.
whcre the insurance would proteC't thl' !'lehool di!'triet only
against Iiabilify for injurip!, to othl'r!' firi!'in!? ont of hll7.nril!'
incidE'nt to;thE' i!i!ltril't'~ ownE'rs~ ani! mllnfl!!'l'mpnt of thp
building. schooll!Tounds. find equipment.. !line!' thp i!istrict
cannot in this manner be relieved of it!' Iiahilitv for a failure
to fulfill its dnties a.s to maintenfln(',e and man~!?ement of its
"':.
property.
[8] Id.-PropeTty-Use as Center of Community Activities-Bent
-Costs of Maintenance aDd Management.-A school district
cannot require the pa~'ment of rent for mE'eting!' in a school
building pursuant to thE' Civil' Center Act if admission fees
are not chaJ'l!'E'd. nor requirE' the spon!lors of such a meeting to
compensate the di!ltrict in any other manner for costs of main.
tenance aDd mana[!ement en!luing from holdin!!' the meeting
in such hnildinl!.
[4] ld.-Properly-Use as Oenter for Oommunity Activities-Pub·
lic Liabflity Insurance. - The ril!ht to use a school building
unencumbered by expense!' for pnhli(' liahility insurance is
established by Ed. Cnde. !I 19437. eXllIi('itlv making it the
duty of the school di!ltrict to !!Tant "free" the nse of school
property for the purpose!' statec1 in the Civic Center A('t. and
also by !I 19439. whose purpose ill to relievE' those who hold
a meeting in a school buildinl! pursuant to that stAtutE' of all
expenses incident to thE' 1l!lE' of thE' huilding.
[5] ld.-Properly-Use as Oenter for Oommunity Activities-Ex·
penses.-Under Ed. Code. § 19439. cha~ng a school district
not only with thE' expenses for the enumerated conveniences,
but also with an "other necessary expenses in connection with
the use of public school buildings." thE' words "other necessary expense!l" do not relate only to expenses for facilities
and services similar to those enumerated. and which are those
which most commonlv Occur. but cover whatever necessary
expenses may arise. The qualifying adjective "necessary" establishes the kinship between the expenses enumerated and
other expense!l.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the granting of an
application to use a school auditorium for a mass meeting without requiring petitioners to furnish public liability
insurance. Writ granted.

Wayne M. COlliIDi, J. Lamar Butler and Lawrence W.
Allen for Petitioners.
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A. L. Wirin as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioncrs.

..

John J. O'Toole, City Attorney, Walter A. Dold, Chief
Deputy City Attlfrney, and Irving G. Breyer for Respondent.'l.
TRAYNOR,~.-By this proceeding in mandamus petitioners seek to,...:.compel respoI!dents. to permit them to use the
auditorium of the Evening High School of Commerce at
San Francisco for a meeting open to the public wit.hout
charge on Sunday afternoon. December 2, 1945. free of any
requirement that th\y furnish publi(' liability insurance.
In an earlier proceeding petitioneJ'!'l Rou!!ht a writ of mandate to compel reRpondent hoard to grant them the use of
the auditorium on an evenin!! when regular cla8!le.<l were Rcheduled in the Rchool bUilding. ThiR court denied their petition.
holding that the board acted within i~ authority under Education Code section 19433 in rejecting petitioneJ'!'l'application
on the ground that the propORed meeting would interfere with
scheduled school activitie.'l fPayro71 Guarantee Association
v. Board of Education, ante. p. 197 fl63 P.2d 4331.) Petitionen then requeRted permiR.~ion to URe the auditorium for
the same purpORe and with the Rame speaker on 8 Sunday
afternoon. when there will be no school activititlR. Respondent board baR granted their application on condition that
petitioneJ'!'l furnish a public liability insurance policy in
the name of the San Francisco Unified School District in the
sum of $100.000 for each injured person and $400.000 for
each accident. In the earlier proceeding. petitioner!l declared
that they would meet that condition under protest. They
now contend that mch a condition would prevent them
from holding the meeting, and have mbmitted affidaviu: t.o
show that. although they have applied to man~' immrance
companies. none haR bflen willing to i!!SUe them 8 policy.
[1] On September 28. 1943. respondent board adopted the
following resolution: "Re.'!olved: That whenever the u!'Ie of
school property iR granted to an out.qide organization under
the provisions of Section 19431 of the California Education
Code. no charge shall be madE' for heating, lighting. janitorial
or other services, except aR !'let forth under the provision!l of
section 19438 of the California Education Code.' and the cost
of mch !'Iervicefl aR notec1 qhall bE' providflc1 for out of !lehool

IThis section authorizes a charge for the nse of eeboolhon!leS. propertl.and pounds for meetinp at wlUch admiasioJl feee are oharied.
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district funds. Further resfllved: 'fhat when an auditorium
or gymnasium is reques~, a public liability insurance policy
shall be furnished in the name of the SaIl Francisco Unified
School District in the sum of $100,900/$400,000, exctlpt that
the requirement for said policy lQIty be waived for organizations, clubs or association.'! organized for general character
building, welfare purposes, or in connection with the national
war effort. Furtlier resolved: That all rules and regulations
of this Board jIt conflict with the above are hereby repealed."
Respondent board contends that this regulation is authorized by sections 2204, 19401, 19433, 19434, and 19435 of the
Education Code, quoted.. in the margin.' Petitioners contend
that the regulation is invalid on the grounds that it violates
the basi<! purpose of the Civic Center Act (Ed. Code, §§ 1943119439) and conflicts with sections 19437 and 19439 of the
Education Code, quoted in the margin. 1 Petitioners have
made their application under the Civic Center Act. That.
act is controlling, and regulations or terms and conditions made by the board in conflict therewith are invalid.

\j

)

)

11"2204. The governing board of any school district shall: (a) Prescribe and enforce rule!' not inconsistent with the law or with the rules
prescribed by the 8tate Board of Edueation, for its own government, and
for the government of the schools under its jurisdiction."
"19401. The governing bOllrd of any school district may grant the Il8e
of school buildings or grounds for public, literary,lcientillc, recreational,
or educational meetings, or for the discussion of matters of general or
public intl'rest upon such terms and conditions as the board deems proper,
and subJect to the limitations. requirements. and restrictions Bet forth
in this chapter"
"19433. The USI' ot any public sellool bouse and grounds for any meetmg is subj8<'t to such reasonable rules and regulations as the governing
board of the district prescribes and shall in nowise interfere with the use
and occupancy of the publit'. schoolhouse and r,-ounds, as is required for
the purposes of thp publit' BChools of the state. '
"19434. The management, direction, and control of the civic center is
vested in the governing board of the aehool district."
"19435. Th!' governing board of the school district shall make all
needful rules and regulntioIUI for conducting the civic meetings and for
such recreational activities as are provided for in this chapter and which
aid, assist, and lend encouragement to the activities."
1"19437. The Ullt: of schOOlhouses, property, and grounds P\l1"ll1l8.Dt to
this chapter shall be granted free,"
"19439. Lighting, heating, janitor service, and the services of the
person when needed, and other necessary expenses, in connection with the.
use of public school buildings and grounds pursuant to this chapter, shall
hp. provided for out of the county or special school funds of the respective school districts in the same manner and by the l&Dle authority ..
similar 88l'vices are provided for."

)
./

/
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(First Industrial Loan Co. v. Dailgherty, 26 Cal.2d 545, 550
[159 P.2d 921]; Whitcomb lfotel Inc. v. California Emp.
Com., 24 Cal.2d 753. 757 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. -l05];
Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 161 [273 P. 797].)
Respondents have stated that the dil;trict is generally not
insured a~ainst public liability with respect to its school
buildings and grounds. but that they deem such insurance
necessaf"y, with certain exceptions, when schools are used for
the purposes specified in the Civic Center Act. We are here
concerned, not with the board's authoritv to insure the district against su'<!b liability (see Ed. Code, § 1029) or with
the exercise of its discretion in determining whether such insurance is necessary, but only with the question whether the
board can require others to pay the costs of such insurance.
[2] Any inquiry into the validity of the regulation must
consider the nature of the insurance protection that respondent board requires petitioners to furnish. Respondent
board states that claims might be made against it for injuries
resulting from an alleged defective condition of the school
building and its equipment or of the school grounds, or from
alleged inadequate exits in case of fire or other emergency,
or from an alleged failure to appoint custodians to maintain
order in connection with the meeting. By way of illustration
. it has filed a policy recently furnished by another association
in connection with an application for the use of the Galileo
High School Auditorium. That policy names as the insured
the "San Francisco Unified School District and/or Individual
Members of San Francisco Board of Education while acting
within the scope of their duties as such" and also the association. The board's regulation, however, requires only that
the policy be furnished in the name of the school district.
The coverage is defined as follows: "Coverage A-Bodily
Injury Liability-To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums
which the Insured shall become obligated to pay by reason
of the liability imposed upon him by law for damageS, including damages for care and loss of services, because of
bodily injury, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person or persons, caused by accident
and arising out of the hazards hereinafter defined. Coverage
B-Property Damage Liability-To pay on behalf of the
Insured all sums which the Insured shall become obligated
to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law
for damages because of injury to or destruction of prope~y,
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including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident and
arising out of the hazards hereinafter defined." The hazards
are defined as follows: "Division 1. Premises-Operations
-The ownership, lllJl.intenance or use, for the purposes stated
in the declarations, of the pre~ses, and all operationR during the policy 6"eriod which are necessary or incidental to
such purposes. Division 2. ElevatorR-The ownership, maintenance, or use, for the ,purposes stated'.in the declarations.
of any elevator therein~designated." The company also
agreed to "defend in his name and behalf any suit against
the Insured alleging such injury or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent."
The policy required would not insure the school district
against injury to the school building or other property of
the district, or against liability for injuries resulting from
conduct of those attending or prote..<rting the meeting for which
respondents would not be responsible. It would insure the
district only against liability for injuries to others arising
out of the hazards incident to the school district's ownership and management of the building, schoolgrounds, and
equipment. Such hazards would arise from the failure of
the district to maintain the premises and equipment in a
reasonably safe condition or to fulfill its duties in managing
the property. In effect respondents demand insurance protection against their liability to others in the event they
fail to fulfill their own duties as owners or managers of
the school property. The cost of that protection is a cost
of maintenance and management. In the absence of insurance,
damages to anyone entitled to recover against the school
district for its failure to fulfill its duties would be paid by
the district, and the district would also bear the cost of
defending the actions brought against it. If a district provided for such risks by maintaining reserves to meet claims
for injury as they arose, the current contributions to such
reserve funds would be costs of maintenance and management just as would the costs of upkeep and repair to minimize the risk of injuries. Similarly, insurance premiums on
a policy protecting the district against liability for failure
to fulfill its duties as to maintenance and management of its
property are part of the cost of such maintenance and management. If a public meeting in a school auditorium attracts
people who otherwise would not enter the premises, and there-

)
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for enlarges the risk of injuries, the district is not thereby
relieved of liability as owner and manager of the property.
In that capacity it must assume the expense of insurance
as it does the~ expense of lighting, heating, and janitorial
service.
.
[3] Although such costs would enter into any rental, the
school district cannot require the payment of rent for meetings pursuant to the ...Civic Center Act, if admission fees are
not charged ...... Nor can it require the sponsors of a meeting
to compensate the district in any other manner for costs of
maintenance and management ensuing from the holding of
a meeting in a school._ building. The district must bear the
burden of costs attendant upon public meetings in school
buildings for the purposes specified in the Civic Center Act,
just as it bears the burden of costs of regular school activities. [4] The Legislature, in the Civic Center Act,
explicitly make,q it the duty of the school district to grant
"free" the use of schoolhouse..<;, property, and grounds for
the purposes stated in the act. (§ 19437.) The use of such
property would not be free if the school district required
the sponsors of a meeting to share the costs of 'maintenance
and management of the buildings and grounds or any part
thereof. The Civic Center Act not only provides school buildings free of charge but facilitates the use of such property
for the public purposes specified in the act, by providing in
section 19439 that the school district shall bear the expenses
attendant upon the public use of the property.
If the right to use a school building unencumbered by
expenses for public liability insurance were not already established by section 19437, it would follow from section 19439,
whose purpose it is to relieve those who hold a meeting in
a school building pursuant to the Civic Center Act of all
expenses incident to the use of the building. [6] Section
19439 charges the district not only with the expenses for
the enumerated conveniences but with all "other necessary
expenses in connection with the use of public school build-'
ings." Respondent board contends that under the ejusdem
generis rule, the words "other necessary expenses" relate
only to expenses for facilities and services similar to those
enumerated. It seems clear, however, that the Legislature
enumerated the expenses that most commonly occur, adding
the accompanying phrase "other necessary expenses" to
cover whatever necessary expenses might arise other than

Nov. 1945]
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the most common ones. Its enumeration of the most common ones carries no implication that other necessary expenses should be borne by the users of a school building
merely because they do not resemble the ones enumerated.
The qualifying adjective Rnecessary" establishes the kinship
between the expeiises .enumerated and other expenses, and
therein lies theJrey to the Legislature's intention that all necessary expenses are to be borne by the district. The theory that
"necessary" designates only tli~e expenses that bear a resemblance as well as a lti.rlship to those enumerated is hardly
tenable, for it would lead to an imposition of necessary expenses upon the users of a school building that would in
effect nullify their right to the free use of the building.
The import of "other necessary expenses" is as broad as
"all necessary expenses" (Ed. Code, § 24410), which the district must bear if school property is used for community
recreation pursuant to chapter 4, division 12 of the Education Code. The Legislature expressly provided in that chapter
(§ 24408) that the use of the school property for recreation
shall not restrict or otherwise affect the use of the property
under the Civic Center Act, thus making the first use subordinate to the second. Yet all necessary expenses incident
to recreational uses of school property must be borne by
the school district. Hence the Legislature could hardly have
intended to impose on the sponsors of a meeting in a school
building under the Civic Center Act any of the necessary
expenses incident to the use of the building for that meeting. If the expense of public liability insurance is necessary to such a meeting, it must be borne by the school
district under section 19439.
This construction of the Civic Center Act is compelled
not only by its wording but by the purpose of the Legislature to make school buildings centers of free public assembly in so far as such assembly does not encroach upon
the educational activities, which constitute the primary purpose of the schools. The purpose of the Legislature would
be frustrated if petitionCfS' right to the free use of the
school auditorium were nullified by the requirement that
they furnish public liability insurance. It follows that the
regulation adopted by respondent board is invalid.
Since the board cannot require the furnishing of a policy
of public liability insurance as a condition for the use of

330
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a school auditorium under the Civic Center Act, it is
unnecessary to consider petitioIlilr's arguments that the exemptions authorized in the. regulation are unreasonably
discriminatory and would en~le the board to act as a censor
by imposing the requirement arbitrarily upon those groups
!
whose views it disapproves.
Let the perempt~ writ issue forthwith.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the views expressed in the
opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor, but I am also
of the opinion that the writ should issue compelling the
board of education to grant the permit for the use of the
auditorium without the requirement that petitioner furnish
to said board a policy of public liability insurance, for the
reason that, in my opinion, the attempted classification of
organizations contained in the resolution adopted by said
hoard on September 28, 1943, cOJu;titutes an unreasonable
and discriminatory regulation which purports to repose in
~'rI icl board unlimited discretion to determine which "organizations. clubs or associations," are "organized for general
<'hnractel' building, welfare purposes, or in connection with
t hE' national war effort," and thus may be exempted from
the requirement of furnishing such a policy. Hence, the
power to censor is thus lodged in the members of the board.
;'his opens the door to permit the board to discriminate in
fayor of organizations and groups which they like and against
those they do not like. Such discrimination is in direct violation of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and
assembly. The constitutional mandate which confers these
rights contemplates that they should be exercised without discrimination. It does not mean that they may be exercised
freely by some and that othen: may exercise them only after
complying with burdensome restrictions, even if such restrictions are such that may be complied with. On the right
to give expression to idea.q there should be no restrictions
except when elements of clear and present danger exist.
It may be true that the Legislature was under no constitutional obligation to dedicate school buildings as civic centers in which citizens and groups ma~' hold public meetings,
but once the Legislature made that dedication, the use to be

)
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made by the people in conducting public meetings at such
civic centers may not be subject either to censorship, arbitrary action or unepnstitntional restrictions by the governing
boards of education.
The constitu1'1Onality of- a regulation having the tendency
to abridge freedom of. speech or assembly should be judged
by the opportunities""'fo~ censorship and discrimination inherent in it, and not alone by the regulation in actual administration. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 2fHl fGO
S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213. 128 :.tJJ.R 1352], in discussing the
provisions of a statute regulating the ~olicitation of funds
by religious organizations, the Supreme Court said:
"But to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of
which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden
burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution." (See, also, Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 [63 S.Ct.
667, 87 L.Ed. 873] j and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 [63 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81].)
When the case of Hague v. C. I. 0.,307 U.S. 496 [59 S.Ct.
954, 83 L.Ed. 1423], was pending before the Supreme Court
of the United States, the American Bar Association's Special Committee on the Bill of Rights filed an amici curiae
brief in support of the contention of the Committee for
Industrial Organization. A summary of this brief is contained in 25 American Bar Association Journal commencing
at page 7. After analyzing the decisions relative to the right
of cities and public boards to exercise control over public
property, the brief contains the following discussion which
is applicable to the problem here involved. I quote from
page 74 of said ,Journal:
"The true analogy to government ownership of parks and
other property dedicated to public uses is furnished by a
public utility, which must give service to all 80 long as this
is consistent with the performance of its functions. It can
regulate, but not di!!criminate. It can refuse to deal with
those who interfere with its functions or with other users
of its service, or when the available services are exhausted.
We already recognize this principle as applied to governmental substitutes for private utilities. Thus a municipal
street railway can eject "drunks" and set a limit on overcrowding, but nobody contends that it can refuse to trans-
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port members of unpopular groups even if other passengers
express a dislike for them.
"In the same '*ay, the parks can be regulated in a manner consistent>l'i-dth their purposes. one of the most important
of which is the right of free assembl~' therein for public
discussion at reasonable times and places. Disorderly per·
sons can be excluded.. 'because the~' interfere with peaceable
users of the parks like drunks in the municipal trolley car.
Open-air meetin~ can be assigned to a particular park or
a particular area, just as passengerR can be assigned to particular seats or told to move awav from the door. If all
the available space i" occll)Jied and there is no more room
for meetings, permits can stop, just as a full municipal street
car can refuse to take on pa..'lsengers. But we submit that
law-abiding Democrats or Republicans or Communist..o; or
unionists or memberR of the American Civil Libertie.c;; Union
ean no more be constitutionally kept out of empty park
spaces reasonably ~itable for open-air meeting!' than they
ean be ejected from an empty municipal trolley car. or be
refused current from a municipal power plant.
"In sum, a city is required to furniRh its municipal services to all, Rubject only to reasonable rules. Surely this principle is no less applicablp when those 'lervi(\e~ include the
making available of space for open-air meetings, in pursuance
of the right of a..'lSembly that is gl1aranteed b~- t.he Constitution of the United States.
"The basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of
the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than
force; and this means talk for all and by all . . . . "
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States was adopted because of t.he fear of the people that
those in power might attempt by law to prohibit the free
exercise of the right to wOl'Rhip or abridge "freedom of speech,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redres.o:: of grievance.'l."
The people of that generation had witnessed the abuse of
power by many of those in whom it was reposed. Washington
knew, as few men did. that the inherent danger which
threatened the overthrow of constitutional Iibertie.c;; was. as
he said, "the love of power and pronene."IS to abuse it. which
predominates in the human heart." ever tempting the administrators of Jaw and justice tl) override the constitutional
guarantees of human rights. It finally required the adoption
/
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of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend to the people of the
several !':tates the rights guaranteed by the First Ten Amendments. But 'Itill the abuse of power continued and will continue so long aR those who are permitted to exercise it are
swayed by con!':iderations" other than those of justice. fairness and equality. -: .
It has been s~id tIfat: "Power is a bell which prevents
those who set It pealing from hearing any other sound."
h the last analysis it is for the court.~ to declare the extent
to which administrative power' may be exercised in the light
of the constitutional and statutory provisions fixing the limits
of such power.

)

EDMONDS, J.-Considering the record in this proceeding.
I find no basis for the conclusion that the court is not concerned "with the board's authority to insure the district
again . . . [public liability with respect to its school buildings and grounds when used for purposes specified in the
Civic Center Act] (see Ed. Code. § 1029) or with the exercise
of its discretion in determinin/! whether such insurance iR
necessary, but only with the question whether the board can
require others to pay the cost." of 'IU<.'h inRUrance." In connection with the demandR of the petitioner for the use of
the auditorium. there had been filed with the Board of Education an affidavit made by Paul Schnur in behalf of various
organization:-; affiliated with the San Francisco Industrial
Union Council and 13 others. including the San Francisco
Federation of Voters Leagues and the National Association
for the Advancement of the Colored People. There iR widespread convi('tion among the thonsandR of members in these
organizations. the affiant declared. that the program of Gerald
L. K. Smith i" intended "to incite to violence by setting race
. against race. religion against religion. white against black. in
an atmosphere of hatred and violence . . . all in order to
create rio1.~. terror and chaoR .." According to the affida\'it
of Schnur. the people represented by him "have read of the
rio1.o; whi<.'h followed close upon . . . fthe] public meetings
and speeche.~ lof Smith] in such citiC!'; as Detroit. New York
and LoR Angeles:
. fand] will not allow Smit.h to conduct a campaign of terror and violence without protest . . ."
With this affidavit before it. the board of education was
confronted with the que.~tion fI,..'1 to its liability for injury to
persons or property in the event that it granted the applica-

,.'
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tiOll for the use of the school auditorium and there was a
riot or other violence. ~V ..Justice Traynor discusses that
liabilit.v solely from the standpoint of responsibility for
negligence in <l-onnection with t.he maintenance or usc of the
building. But there ma~' be liability without fault. The
doctrine Is....applicable, it ill said. ~here. even though the
defendant's conr1urt i!-i sociall~' acsil'a ble. the danger which it
threatem; to others is unusually great, and will be great even
though the enterpri!l\l is conducted with ever~' possible pre·
caut.ion. Because of the unusual gravity of t.he risk. he is held
liable for act.!' which in themselves are regarded as reason·
able. The basis of liability is his intentional behavior in ex· .
posing the community to such a risk. The conduct which is
dealt with here occupies a middle ground; it is conduct which
has so much social utility that it wiJ] not be t.reated as wrong·
ful in itself, and will not be prohibited or enjoined in ad·
vance, but not so much that the defendant may be allowed
to carry it on without liability at the expense of actual dam·
age to his neighbors." (Pros.<;er on Torts, p. 429.)
The application of the organization sponsoring Smith to
use the school property came to the board of education with
at leMt a prima facie showing that there had been riots at
meeting!' of a similar character held in other citie,.<; and the
consequent possibility of suit." for damages in the event of
violence at a meeting addressed by Smith in the Commerce
High School. Under these circumlrtances, the requirement
of the board for public liability insurance is not an unreasonable one. A majority of the court impliedly. if not directly,
so hold. but they say that if !lUch insurance is necessary,
the premium for the policy must be paid by the school district as an expense specified in section 19439 of the Education
Code. However, the board of education has no authority to
procure public liability insurance with full coyerage against
responsibility for injurie.~ to persons or property. Under the
Education Code the district may only insure its liability
and the personal liability of the members of the board "for
damages by reason of death, or injury to person or property,
as the result of any negligent act." (Italic.~ added.) (§ 1029.)
Accordingly. by the decision of thi~ court. the Board of
Education ~ required to allow the use of school property
for a meeting which, there is reasonable ground to believe, may result in violence or riot, but it cannot protect
its members or the district with liability iDsurance for
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the benefit of the public except al; a private undertaking
at private expense.
No one haR all absolut'll'ight to hold a meeting in a public
school, and the Legislntpre has declared that the use of any
public SCllOolhouse and grounds "is subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the governillg board of the district prescribes." (Ed. Code, §.194·33.) Free speech is one
of 0UI' most cherished constituti~'nal rights but. it is subject
to certain limitations, For example. as Mr ..Justice Holmes
laconically stated, the right of free speech does not permit
one falsely to cry "Fire" in a crowded theatre. (Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 [39 8. Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 4701.)
For thes"l reasons, in my opinion, the writ of mandate
should be denied.
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